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Global Governance and Energy 
 
Ann Florini1 
 
Abstract: Energy has risen to the top of policy agendas around the world.  There is now widespread 
recognition that energy policy has become key to international security, economic development, and 
the environmental sustainability of modern civilization.  Yet this importance is not reflected in the 
world’s institutional infrastructure for managing global problems.  A handful of international 
organizations work in uncoordinated fashion on various pieces of the energy puzzle.  No 
organizational infrastructure exists to support the global conversation that is now badly needed about 
how to move the world onto a sustainable path that provides appropriate, reliable, and affordable 
energy services. 
 
Keywords:  Energy, governance, global governance, international security, environmental 
sustainability, development, human rights, international organizations. 
 
Few issues on the global agenda more urgently need fresh governance approaches than 
energy. Energy policy is being hit by two simultaneous tidal waves.  First, the extraordinary 
economic rise of Asia has transformed global energy markets - as Graph 1 indicates, the IEA 
predicts that the next few decades will see unprecedented growth in demand for energy 
resources - while the usual sources of energy supply are severely threatened by political 
turmoil.  Second, the ever-more-convincing evidence on the pace of climate change makes 
clear that the planet will not allow future economic growth to follow the same fossil-fuel-
based path that the industrialized nations have taken. 
Graph 1: Increase in demand, by fuel type 
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“Governance” refers to any and all of the myriad ways in which groups of people attempt to 
solve collective action problems, deal with externalities, and ensure the provision of public 
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goods.  The term encompasses but goes beyond governmental functions to include the 
agenda-setting, negotiation, regulatory, implementation, and monitoring roles that are 
sometimes played by businesses or civil society actors. “Global governance” refers to efforts 
to deal with the wide range of border-crossing issues involving multiple states and other 
actors from multiple parts of the world.  It includes, but is not limited to, the work of inter-
governmental organizations established by governments.   
 
Even by the low standards of most global governance, energy policy fares particularly poorly.  
On the surface, “energy” comprises quite different policy problems.  The policies needed to 
ensure secure sea lanes for shipping oil supplies, for example, are not obviously connected to 
the difficulties of dealing with the environmental spillovers from biofuels production, and 
neither seems tightly bound up with the human rights abuses that plague the extractive 
industries.  Thus, “energy” has been governed piecemeal, if at all, in ad-hoc responses to 
specific problems involving specific countries or groups of countries.  Moreover, the short 
time horizons of most policy makers do not usually allow for the sustained attention to long-
term problems that energy policy inherently requires.  And the decision makers and policy 
analysts responsible for the various energy-related issues work in very different communities 
that rarely communicate with one another. 
 
As energy problems take center stage on the world’s agenda of pressing issues, the 
inadequacies of such a scattershot approach are becoming all too obvious.  The apparently 
unrelated issues that fall under the “energy” rubric are in reality all woven of the same cloth.  
At root, the issue is how best to achieve the services energy provides - heating, cooling, 
lighting, cooking, transportation, industrial power. 
 
A sustainable and secure energy policy would start with a broad assessment of existing and 
likely future needs for those services, and would examine the full range of benefits and costs 
(including the environmental and social costs not currently included in price signals) of 
various energy sources.  Such an assessment could not be carried out on a purely national 
basis, given most countries’ inability to meet their own energy needs from purely domestic 
sources and the various spillover effects of energy production and consumption. 
 
Such assessments are not taking place today.  Even if the political will and the resources 
existed, the institutional mechanisms for countries to come together in the needed 
conversation do not. Nor do adequate mechanisms exist to monitor or enforce agreements 
that might aim to coordinate energy policies. 
 
The invisible hand of the market alone will not substitute for effective global energy 
governance.  Energy policy is overwhelmingly about scarcities that market mechanisms are 
not well suited to resolve - not enough supply at affordable prices (particularly for the poor), 
not enough infrastructure to deliver that supply, not enough carbon sinks to absorb carbon 
emissions.  Such scarcities drive policy makers to pursue any (or all) of three options: 
 
1. to fight for larger shares of the pie (the zero-sum approach) 
2. to use technology to increase the size of the pie 
3. to use rules and policy change both to increase the available pie and to fairly allocate its 
slices where scarcity remains unavoidable 
 
This paper explores what could be accomplished via the third approach.  This focus is not 
meant to denigrate the need for massive investment in technology development.  Clearly, 
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technological change is essential to meet the world’s growing energy needs in a way that 
does not overwhelm the environment on which we all depend.  The need for rapid 
improvement and innovation in energy technology is well recognized, and significant funds 
are flowing, both from governments and from the private sector.2  But technology 
development alone will not suffice to overcome the collective action problems of the energy 
sector. 
 
This paper starts by identifying the broad problems that energy policy should address.  It then 
looks at the existing mechanisms for addressing those problems, with a brief history of how 
and why some of those institutions arose and an analysis of how well they deal with the 
agenda.  It ends with an assessment of various options for improving global energy 
governance. 
 
 
Where Governance is Needed 
It is clear that global energy policy is in need of dramatic and urgent change.  Just to stay on 
the current fossil-fuel-intensive path would require some $22 trillion in new investments 
between now and 2030, according to the International Energy Agency. 3   Changing course to 
a politically and environmentally sustainable energy system for the world would require even 
more – not in terms of funding, but in terms of institutional and organizational development, 
along with a hefty helping of political leadership. 
 
The first step in evaluating the state of energy governance is to define what problems 
governance is needed to solve. Managing the supply of and demand for energy poses four 
sets of problems that require global governance: 
 
• energy security; 
• environmental sustainability; 
• economic development; and 
• respect for human rights.4 
 
Energy security:  Energy security – usually defined as reliable and affordable access to 
energy supplies - is inextricably tied up with military and national security.  Ever since the 
British fleet converted from coal to oil on the eve of World War I to makes the British fleet 
faster than its German counterpart,5 major powers have looked upon access to oil as a vital 
national interest, and threats to that access may trigger a military response.  The attack upon 
Pearl Harbor - triggered when the U.S., which supplied the vast majority of Japan’s oil, 
responded to Japan’s invasion of Indochina by freezing Japan’s U.S. assets and cutting off oil 
exports - has been described as the “first energy war”.6  After the 1973 oil price shock, Henry 
Kissinger argued that US security had been very directly affected: 
 
In the last three decades we have become so increasingly dependent on 
imported energy that today our economy and well-being are hostage to 
decisions made by nations thousand of miles away…  The energy crisis has 
placed at risk all of this nation’s objectives in the world.  It has mortgaged our 
economy and made our foreign policy vulnerable to unprecedented pressures.7  
 
Concerns about such vulnerabilities, and fears that competition over energy resources could 
turn violent, continue today. As one recent report noted, 
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… with new oilfields being discovered at a slowing rate and alternative energy 
yet to fully deliver on its promise, the resulting competition, and attempts to 
secure their safe delivery, could constitute a potential trigger for inter-state 
tensions, even conflict.8 
 
But oil vulnerabilities and tensions are only a portion of the problem. Electricity shortages 
and blackouts have disrupted life in the US, Europe, Russia and many developing countries. 
As the market for natural gas expands both regionally and globally, new vulnerabilities 
emerge in that sector. Al Qaeda has threatened to attack the world’s critical economic 
infrastructure, of which energy is clearly a key component.  As leading energy analyst Daniel 
Yergin has pointed out, the challenges of energy security are enormous and growing: 
 
In the United States alone, there are more than 150 refineries, 4,000 offshore 
platforms, 160,000 miles of oil pipelines, facilities to handle 15 million barrels 
of oil a day of imports and exports, 10,400 power plants, 160,000 miles of 
high-voltage electric power transmission lines, and 1.4 million miles of natural 
gas pipelines.  None of the world’s complex, integrated supply chains were 
built with security, defined in this broad way, in mind….The challenge of 
energy security will grow more urgent in the years, because the scale of the 
global trade in energy will grow substantially as world markets become more 
integrated.  Currently, every day some 40 million barrels of oil cross oceans 
on tankers; by 202, that number could jump to 67 million… The amount of 
natural gas crossing oceans as LNG will triple to 460 million tons by 
2020…Assuring the security of global energy markets will require 
coordination on both an international and a national basis among companies 
and governments, including energy, environmental, military, law enforcement, 
and intelligence agencies.9 
 
The public debate often confuses energy security with national energy independence, which 
would require a country to meet its energy needs from sources within its own borders.  
Energy independence is neither feasible for most countries nor particularly desirable as a goal 
in itself. Dependence on a world market that functions well is beneficial, not harmful - this is 
as true for energy as for all other globally traded goods and services, for which specialization 
and trade demonstrably lowers costs and increases economic efficiency for all.10   
 
It is not market forces per se that are the problem, but vulnerability to supply disruption or 
price shocks.  Such problems occur in part because energy sources, especially oil, are not 
evenly distributed around the world. Instead, a large and rising share of the world’s known oil 
reserves are concentrated in a handful of largely volatile and unstable countries - notably in 
the Middle East, Russia, Nigeria and Venezuela.  Moreover, energy, especially oil, does not 
operate as a normal market, given that most oil supplies are controlled by a handful of 
government-dominated firms.11  And energy markets in virtually all countries suffer from 
varying degrees of distortion via subsidies and taxes.  Although some such distortions, such 
as high European petrol taxes, are aimed primarily at addressing public goods problems, 
many provide undue economic rents to politically powerful sectors, making it politically 
difficult to change policies to bring about more economically rational energy markets. In 
short, part of the answer to increasing energy security is to make the relevant markets 
function more reliably and effectively - a classic governance activity. 
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Environmental sustainability:  To date, the major energy-associated negative 
environmental externalities have been associated with the extraction and consumption of 
fossil fuels.  Such fuels constitute the overwhelming share of primary energy sources.  As 
graph 2 shows, on current trends that picture is unlikely to change for some decades.  The 
environmental consequences of continued fossil fuel dependence are severe.  By far the lion’s 
share of attention is currently focused on climate change, as is appropriate given the 
overwhelming scientific consensus that human activities are responsible for an unnatural 
accumulation of greenhouse gases that are causing the atmosphere and oceans to become 
warmer.12 
 
But the burning of fossil fuels also creates other major problems such as smog and acid rain, 
issues that have come to plague some emerging market countries at alarming levels. 
Transportation of oil leads to contamination of the marine environment, most dramatically in 
the form of oil spills but also through normal operation of offshore wells, washing out of oil 
tankers, and storage tank leaks, in addition to spill-off from land-based activities.13  
 
Graph 2: Energy demand by fuel source
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A move to a fully environmentally sustainable energy strategy is not, however, solely a 
matter of adopting an “anything but fossils” approach.  Non-fossil fuel energy sources pose 
their own environmental challenges.  Nuclear energy inherently involves such highly 
proliferation-prone and toxic materials as uranium and plutonium, some isotopes of which 
need to be safely stored for many thousands of years.  The excitement over biofuels is only 
slowly giving way to recognition of some unpleasant realities.  Although these fuels are 
carbon neutral (they absorb carbon dioxide while growing, then release it when burned), 
cultivation of crops for fuel raises serious environmental and social dilemmas - soil 
degradation, deforestation (with associated greenhouse gas emissions when, as is often the 
case, land is cleared by burning), and “food or fuel” competition over the best use of crops.  
Even the far more benign renewable energy sources impose externalities. Hydropower, a 
major generator of electricity in many countries, requires the construction of large dams, 
which frequently wreak local environmental havoc and can displace thousands or millions of 
people.14 Solar photovoltaic (PV) cells contain toxic substances, and their energy must be 
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stored in batteries that also contain toxins.  Wind power can only work in certain locations 
and is generated by huge turbines, usually metal, whose production requires substantial 
energy inputs. (However, the environmental costs of solar phtovoltaics and wind power are 
trivial (valued at less than a cent per kilowatt hour, versus 11.10cents per kilowatt hour for 
advanced nuclear and 19.1 for scrubbed coal.15 
 
Development:  While growing use of modern energy sources, particularly fossil fuels, is 
creating one set of major governance challenges, the lack of access to these or other modern 
energy sources is creating another set.  Current energy policies have failed to address the 
needs of vast numbers of people. Nearly two billion lack access to electricity, which is 
essential to a decent quality of life.  As IEA Chief Economist Faith Birol notes, “the number 
of people using dirty traditional biomass for cooking is set to grow from 2.5 billion now to 
2.7 billion in 2030 absent new policies.” 16  
 
The continuing failure to address the energy needs of the poor threatens prospects for 
economic development.  The transition from subsistence agricultural economies to modern 
industrial and services-oriented societies inherently requires adequate and affordable energy 
supplies. Moreover, the reliance on traditional biomass directly threatens human health on a 
massive scale.  Nearly half of all households around the world cook their daily food with 
unprocessed biomass (wood, coal, or dung.) According to the World Health Organization, the 
result is deadly: “about 2.5 million deaths each year result from indoor exposures to 
particulate matter in rural and urban areas in developing countries, representing 4-5% of the 
50-60 million global deaths that occur annually.”17 
 
For these reasons, the UNDP has stated that none of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MGDs) can be met without major improvements in the quality and quantity of energy 
services in developing countries.  The UN Millennium Project, an advisory body constituted 
by then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to recommend practical steps toward achieving 
the MDGs, argued forcefully that “greater quality and quantity of energy services will be 
required to meet the MDGs”.18  
 
 
Human Rights:  The extractive industries in general suffer frequent accusations of gross 
human rights abuses.  The UN’s Special Representative on business and human rights, 
Harvard professor John Ruggie, found that oil, gas, and mining firms “utterly dominate[d]” a 
survey of 65 instances of egregious human rights abuses, as reported by NGOs, accounting 
for two-thirds of the total.”19  The alleged abuses included such acts as “complicity in crimes 
against humanity, typically for acts committed by public and private security forces 
protecting company assets and property; large-scale corruption; violations of labor rights, and 
a broad array of abuses in relation to local communities, especially indigenous people”.20  As 
Ruggie notes, this predominance of extractive industries is no great surprise: 
 
No other [sector] has so enormous and intrusive a social and environmental 
footprint.  At local levels in poor countries no effective public institutions may 
be in place.  This authority vacuum may compel responsible companies, faced 
with some of the most difficult social challenges imaginable, to perform de 
facto governmental roles for which they are all equipped, while other firms 
take advantage of the asymmetry of power they enjoy.21 
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Fossil fuel companies are no exception.  Oil resources in particular are located in countries 
whose track record on human rights is less than stellar.  The oil firms that do business in 
those countries find themselves tarred with the same brush: 
 
• Shell Oil, for example, suffered widespread condemnation for its alleged connection to 
Nigerian troops who committed serious abuses in the course of protecting Shell personnel 
and equipment.  Shell paid transportation costs and salary supplements to troops living 
outside their barracks, which Shell later defended as normal practice.  The company 
claimed it had no control over the troops.  But the New York Times reported that an 
internal memorandum indicated Shell specifically requested the “mobile” police, who 
were locally known as the “kill and go” mob.22  International condemnation of Nigeria’s 
human rights abuses and Shell’s alleged complicity exploded in the mid-1990s, when 
Nigeria executed the noted author Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni colleagues who had 
been campaigning against the devastation of the Niger Delta.23 
 
• In 1996, Unocal found itself facing US federal lawsuits over its alleged complicity in 
human rights violations at the Yadana gas pipeline project in Burma.  Yadana is an 
enormously rich gasfield with more than 5 trillion cubic feet, under the Andaman Sea 
some 69 kilometers south of Rangoon.  The project entails a mostly undersea complex of 
more than 400 kilometers of pipelines, with only the final 63 kilometers crossing southern 
Burma to the Thai border.24  Unocal, one of four parties in the project consortium, was 
sued under the controversial U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act by the NGO Earth Rights 
International on behalf of a group of Burmese villagers. The suits alleged that Unocal 
knowingly allowed the Burmese military to conscript forced labor and carry out a raft of 
brutal human rights violations.25  In 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court found that “the 
evidence does suggest that Unocal knew that forced labor was being utilized and that the 
Joint Venturers benefited from the practice,” and thus concluded that corporations and 
their executives could be held liable.26  In December 2004, the parties settled out of court 
on confidential terms. 
 
• It is not only Western energy corporations that find themselves facing human rights 
challenges.  Chinese oil companies operating in Darfur are now in the spotlight.  Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch have targeted CNPC (China National Petroleum 
Corporation) with accusations of complicity in human rights violations.  As HRW puts it, 
“Their activities are inextricably intertwined with the governmental abuses; the abuses are 
gross; the corporate presence fuels, facilitates, or benefits from violations; and no 
remedial measures exist to mitigate those abuses”.27  And China is clearly willing to use 
its international power, including its veto power in the UN Security Council, to protect 
the Sudanese regime from international sanctions brought on by its egregious abuses.28 
 
In addition to these claims of involvement in human rights abuses, advocacy groups have also 
issued numerous reports documenting what they allege to be systematic complicity in misuse 
of government revenues from oil and gas by firms operating in repressive or poorly governed 
countries.29  As one step toward countering such corruption, in 2002 the UK spearheaded the 
launch of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), calling on governments 
that receive substantial energy revenues to publish accounts of those revenues.30  The EITI 
puts the onus on governments, rather than corporations, to become transparent.  Advocacy 
groups point out that very few governments have yet complied with EITI requirements to 
publish fully audited and reconciled EITI reports.31 
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Governing Energy: Who are the Governors? 
 
No overarching international organization is mandated to address any one of the collective 
action issues that energy poses.  Energy needs are met largely through market forces (often 
heavily distorted by government policies), but global energy markets are extremely volatile 
and poorly regulated.  The International Energy Agency, despite its name, is actually a 
creature of the OECD with only 27 members, and it addresses only a small portion of the 
issues outlined in this paper. 
 
Although there is no comprehensive global energy agency, a multitude of intergovernmental 
bodies and non-governmental groups play some role in addressing global energy issues.  
These include large multilateral organizations with a specific energy focus, such as the IEA, 
the Energy Charter Treaty, and the International Energy Forum; a variety of small-scale 
public-private partnerships and multi-stakeholder processes; bodies that focus on a specific 
energy source such as the International Atomic Energy Agency; funders such as the 
multilateral development banks that include energy projects in their loan portfolios; business 
organizations, advocacy groups, and research institutions.  A number of other institutions 
address energy as well, such as the G8, the European Union, and APEC.   
 
No single paper can address more than a fraction of these.  This paper looks in depth at a few 
key organizations and governance processes to begin the process of drawing out lessons 
about how global governance of energy might, and should, evolve. 
 
The International Energy Agency: Before 1974, no explicit agreements existed among 
governments to govern the actions of states and multinationals with regard to oil, the most 
easily transported and heavily traded energy source.32  Then came the Arab-Israeli war of 
1973.  Members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) seized the 
opportunity to simultaneously increase oil prices (and thus revenues) and send a powerful 
political message by embargoing oil sales to countries they considered overly friendly to 
Israel.33  By December, global oil supplies had fallen by 7%.34  Initially, consuming nations 
responded competitively, in a manner uncomfortably reminiscent of the everyone-for-himself 
economic policies of the 1930s, when competitive devaluations and trade barriers turned a 
stock market crash into the most severe depression of the 20th century.    The European 
Community issued a pro-Arab resolution, which succeeded in easing Arab oil restrictions for 
those countries.  Many governments pressured oil companies to grant them priority in the 
allocation of available supplies. (The companies by and large declined to play favorites, 
instead sharing the pain equally among their customers.)35  The OECD Secretariat proposed 
an oil-sharing arrangement to calm the panic, but to no avail. 
 
In early 1974, the US convened an international energy conference, at which the assembled 
governments agreed on an International Energy Program that established the IEA.  By the 
end of 1978, the IEA was fully operational, housed at the OECD in Paris and comprising 
most OECD members (although not France).  In what appeared to be a significant derogation 
of national sovereignty, the emergency oil-sharing system created under the Agency’s 
auspices delegated to the Secretariat the authority to declare an emergency that would bring 
the system’s operations into play.  The agency had also established reporting systems on 
prices, supply and stock positions.  Things seemed so tranquil in 1978 that many companies 
reduced their oil stocks.36 
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The Iranian revolution destroyed that tranquility.  With Iranian production down to almost 
nothing in early 1979, importing governments initially responded just as competitively as 
they had in the 1973 crisis.  The scramble for supplies doubled prices, sparking a major 
increase in production that nonetheless failed to bring prices back down.  The IEA Secretariat 
never invoked the emergency oil-sharing system, instead attempting - unsuccessfully - to 
informally coordinate its members’ actions.37  
 
One IEA aim was to set oil import targets for each member.  At a meeting in 1980, members 
approved a set of targets, but at such high levels that they had no real effect on limiting 
demand. Over the next couple of years, IEA members tried but failed, despite strong 
American support, to negotiate agreement on a set of objective criteria by which the IEA 
could set national import targets.  The debate over import targets proved useful as a way of 
bolstering the case for conservation efforts by keeping the need to control energy 
consumption on the agenda - but the failure to reach agreement showed the difficulty of 
getting governments to limit their sovereign autonomy for the greater good.  IEA members 
were similarly unable to agree on a formal rules-based approach to managing and using oil 
stockpiles.38 
 
In contrast, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, although it drastically 
reduced available supplies, had a much less dramatic effect on oil prices.  Markets clearly 
played a major role - oil companies had turned their attention to the development of non-
OPEC sources, and the depreciation of the dollar, in which oil prices are denominated, 
dampened price impacts.39  But the IEA also played a role in keeping oil markets calm.  By 
then, the agency’s reporting system was functioning, and the Secretariat was better placed to 
use its powers of persuasion on its members.40  This helped to prevent the self-defeating cycle 
of stockpiling and hoarding that had characterized the earlier crises. 
 
Since then, the IEA has helped to coordinate responses among consuming nations to a series 
of shocks and disruptions in global oil markets:  the 1990-1991 Gulf war; plans for the Y2K 
concerns; 9/11; and the Iraq war.  Throughout, the existence of the IEA, and of its members’ 
more than one billion barrels of strategic petroleum reserves, helped to deter market 
manipulation.41 
 
But now, serious questions have arisen about the system’s capacity to cope with future 
shocks and disruptions.  IEA membership is limited to countries that belong to the OECD. As 
of now, its 27 members include all OECD countries except Iceland and Mexico.  As oil 
demand soars among countries that are not members of the OECD or the IEA, notably India 
and China, it is not clear that the agency retains the critical mass needed to manage a future 
shortfall.42 
 
The Group of Eight: By any standard, the G8 is an odd institution.  With no charter, no 
permanent secretariat or home, no fixed membership, and no formal admission criteria, it has 
nonetheless become a fixture on the international scene, bringing together several of the 
world’s most powerful leaders every year for more than 30 years. Although some analysts 
have come to denigrate the G8 as nothing more than an inconsequential talking shop,43 over 
the years some of the G8 summits appear to have helped to coordinate international action 
and establish norms.  The G8 has been particularly active with regard to energy policy. 
 
The G8, despite its name, began with only six members (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
UK, and the US) at a summit in Rambouillet, France initiated by French President Giscard 
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d’Estaing.  Canada joined the next year, creating the G7.  The European Community began 
participating in 1977.  Russia took part in the political meetings in the early 1990s and 
became a full member in 1997.44 
 
The G8’s attention to energy has waxed and waned, closely tracking oil prices.45  In its early 
days (1975 to 1981), the then-G7 did reasonably well in responding to the turmoil in oil 
markets.  The Rambouillet declaration referred to the need to “cooperate in order to reduce 
our dependence on imported energy through conservation and the development of alternative 
sources,” along with a commitment to “spare no effort in order to ensure more balanced 
conditions and a harmonious and steady development in the world energy market.”46  In 
subsequent years, member states made real and sometimes very detailed commitments.  One 
paragraph of the 1978 Bonn Declaration, for example, was an extraordinarily public promise 
of specific US policy measures: 
 
Recognizing its particular responsibility in the energy field, the United States 
will reduce its dependence on imported oil. The U.S. will have in place by the 
end of the year a comprehensive policy framework within which this effort 
can be urgently carried forward. By year-end, measures will be in effect that 
will result in oil import savings of approximately 2.5 million barrels per day 
by 1985. In order to achieve these goals, the U.S. will establish a strategic oil 
reserve of 1 billion barrels; it will increase coal production by twothirds; it 
will maintain the ratio between growth in gross national product and growth in 
energy demand at or below 0.8; and its oil consumption will grow more slowly 
than energy consumption. The volume of oil imported in 1978 and 1979 
should be less than that imported in 1977. In order to discourage excessive 
consumption of oil and to encourage the movement toward coal, the U.S. 
remains determined that the prices paid for oil in the U.S. shall be raised to the 
world level by the end of 1980.47  
 
The communiqué of the 1980 Venice summit contained many pages of energy promises, 
couched in a near-hysterical tone: 
 
In this, our first meeting of the 1980s, the economic issues that have 
dominated our thoughts are the price and supply of energy… Unless we can 
deal with the problems of energy, we cannot cope with other problems.48 
 
By 1982, however, oil prices were in decline.  The G8 was left in disarray by US-European 
feuding over the proposed pipeline to bring natural gas from Russia’s rich fields to energy-
hungry Europe.  Through most of the next two decades, as oil prices remained low, energy 
(other than continuing concern with the proliferation aspects of nuclear energy) barely earned 
a mention in G8 documents, other than a blip in the 1991 London communiqué due to that 
year’s Gulf crisis.49 
 
That began to change toward the end of the millennium. Japan, as host of both the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations on climate change and the 2000 G8 summit, wanted a strong 
new initiative on renewable energy.50 At their Okinawa summit in 2000, the G8 tried 
something new, creating the G8 Renewable Energy Task Force co-chaired by Shell head Sir 
Mark Moody-Stuart and Dr Corrado Clini, Director General of Italy’s Department of 
Environment. Its membership drew not only from G8 governments, but also from business 
and civil society and from non-G8 countries.51  Their report, delivered to the G8 in July 2001, 
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laid out a compelling case for a major shift to renewables, and set out recommendations for 
using market forces and a variety of funding mechanisms to bring about that shift.52 
 
But the task force exercise has to go down as one of the major missed opportunities for 
getting the world onto a more sensible and sustainable energy path.  By 2001 the political 
landscape of the G8 had changed dramatically.  George W. Bush, at his first G8 summit, 
seemed to see the task force’s work as a Clintonian exercise of no interest to the incoming 
administration. The 2001 Genoa summit barely acknowledged the report and let the task 
force die.53 
 
By 2004, rising oil prices and the perceived connection between Middle East oil revenues and 
vulnerabilities and terrorism helped turn the leaders’ attention back toward energy policy.  By 
2005, with climate change at the top of host Tony Blair’s agenda, energy policy featured in 
much of the discussion, with serious commitments on energy efficiency, cleaner energy 
technology, and investment in such technologies for developing countries.  The St Petersburg 
2006 summit had energy as its central focus. 
 
Although the G8 process may have helped to focus the attention of great powers on energy 
issues, to date the process has not proven able to serve as a central mechanism for global 
energy governance.  A few months before the St. Petersburg summit, John Kirton, a leading 
Canadian authority on the G8 (and a strong proponent of the view that the G8 has been quite 
successful on energy policy), presented a Moscow conference with a set of eminently 
sensible recommendations on what the G8 should do that summer to take advantage of its 
combined political and economic muscle and its past successes in the energy field.  He 
suggested that the summit focus intensively on energy, framed as “environmentally 
sustainable energy,” with particular emphasis on mobilizing the market to carry out whatever 
specific commitments the G8 would make.    Those specific commitments would include 
serious attention to re-balancing subsidies away from nuclear and the dirtier fossil fuels 
toward cleaner and more sustainable sources; a shift toward ecological national accounting 
that would reveal the real costs of existing energy policies; creation of a more global natural 
gas market using LNG, and a greater institutionalization of G8 energy institutions, at the 
ministerial, official, and multi-stakeholder levels.54 
 
The G8 leaders did none of those things.  The summit’s Global Energy Security statement 
was long on what should be done, but vague on what exactly the G8 governments would 
themselves do. It was silent on subsidies and ecological accounting.  Although the statement 
treated energy efficiency, renewables, and new energy technology at length, the most 
concrete commitment was to “consider national goals for reducing energy intensity of 
economic development to be reported by the end of the year.”   
 
The Energy Charter Treaty:  The end of the Cold War seemed to offer a new opportunity to 
bolster energy markets and thus energy security by incorporating at least one major supplier - 
Russia - into a rules-based framework.  In December 1991, following Dutch Prime Minister 
Ruud Lubbers’ proposal for a European Energy Community, a number of European countries 
signed the Energy Charter political declaration.  Three years later, this led to the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT), signed in Lisbon in December 1994, with entry into force in April 
1998 upon the ratification of thirty members.55  Membership now stands at 51 countries plus 
the European Communities, including a number of non-European parties such as Australia, 
Japan, and central Asia.  Countries and organizations with observer status include China, the 
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US, Venezuela, Iran, Kuwait, ASEAN, the World Bank, the OECD, the IEA, and the CIS 
Electric Power Council, among others. 
 
Although the ECT includes attention to energy efficiency as one of its five pillars, 
overwhelmingly the ECT’s purpose, as its website makes clear, is to stabilize markets and 
thus enhance energy security: 
 
In a world of increasing interdependence between net exporters of energy and 
net importers, it is widely recognized that multilateral rules can provide a more 
balanced and efficient framework for international cooperation than is offered 
by bilateral agreements alone or by non-legislative instruments. The Energy 
Charter Treaty therefore plays an important role as part of an international effort 
to build a legal foundation for energy security, based on the principles of open, 
competitive markets and sustainable development.56 
 
The ECT’s other four pillars address foreign energy investment, energy trade, freedom of 
transit through pipelines and grids, along with a dispute resolution procedure.  On investment, 
under the terms of the treaty, parties are obliged to extend national treatment (most-favored-
nation status) to nationals and legal entities of all other parties that have invested in its energy 
sector, thus replacing the need for a network of bilateral investment protection treaties.  On 
trade, the ECT accepts WTO rules and standards (see discussion below of energy and the 
WTO), which extends WTO-type rules to several ECT parties that are not yet members of the 
WTO.57  The dispute resolution procedure relies on arbitration. 
 
It is above all the transit issue that has proven problematic, particularly for Russia.  In 1998, a 
number of Russia’s energy-exporting neighbors and transit countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) raised the issue, arguing that if 
commercial oil and natural gas pipeline projects were to succeed, an attractive political, 
technical, financial and legal environment would have to be created.  Since the pipelines 
cross borders, an attractive commercial environment would require an inter-governmental 
agreement.  The G8 Energy Ministerial Meeting that year agreed, and established a Transit 
Working Group. Negotiations on a Transit Protocol began under ECT auspices in early 
2000.58 
 
But Russia proved unwilling to agree to provisions that would effectively allow non-Russian 
companies to buy gas in Central Asia and ship it to Europe via Russian pipelines, instead of 
having to sell it to Russia which then conveys it to Europe.  In late 2006, Russia made clear 
that it does not intend to give up control of its pipelines and will not ratify the Energy Charter 
unless those provisions are renegotiated.59 It also seems likely that Russia does not wish to 
submit to the ECT’s arbitration procedures for price disputes and its ban on cutting off 
supplies.60 
The difficulties over the ECT are just one piece of a larger global governance failure.  The 
effort to incorporate Russia into a rules-based energy market system is failing spectacularly.  
Flush with cash and confidence, Russia has bullied foreign energy firms out of the enormous 
Sakhalin Island project61 and has cut off supplies to Ukraine and Belarus in pricing 
disputes.62  In October 2006, Gazprom reversed a major policy decision, announcing that it 
would develop the enormous Shtokman gas fields without the foreign investors who 
previously were to have been allocated a 49 percent share.63 
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The WTO:  As many energy exporters, including OPEC members, Central Asian countries, 
and Russia all negotiate the terms of accession for their entry into the World Trade 
Organization, the WTO is taking on increasing importance as a focal point for energy-
relevant trade rules.  Trade rules cover most of the policy instruments governments have 
available to them to improve energy efficiency and govern their energy sectors, from taxation 
to subsidies to standards and labeling requirements.64   
 
But trade rules fit awkwardly with energy policy.  WTO rules are meant to address import 
barriers - tariffs and other measures that countries use to keep out other countries’ goods and 
services.  With regard to energy, however, few import barriers exist. Most energy importers 
are scrambling to increase those imports, not exclude them.  Instead, the barriers to trade 
come from exporters, in such forms as export duties, which can raise significant revenues for 
exporting countries.  WTO rules do not address supply monopolies or cartels, or such issues 
as the pipeline transit rules that have derailed Russia’s ratification of the Energy Charter 
Treaty. 
 
In many cases, WTO policy may inhibit good energy policy. Carbon taxes on fuels, which 
several countries have already adopted,65 would pass muster.  But it is not clear whether the 
rules would allow tax policy to discriminate between methods of energy production, such as 
favoring electricity from renewables over electricity from other sources.  Similarly, direct 
support to renewable energy industries may fall afoul of WTO prohibitions on subsidizing 
specific industries within a sector.66  In the meantime, perverse but long-established subsidies 
- which benefit greenhouse-gas-producing energy sources at the expense of cleaner ones - 
abound.  The world’s poorer countries (non-OECD members) subsidize oil products to the 
tune of over $90 billion a year.67   
 
International Energy Forum:  Since its first meeting in 1991 in South Africa, the IEF has 
brought together the energy ministers of energy producing and importing countries every year 
for exchanges of views.68  Based in Saudi Arabia, it focuses almost exclusively on oil and 
natural gas, and does not address energy security, diversification, renewables, or 
environmental issues.  Its major accomplishment to date is the establishment of the Joint Oil 
Data Initiative (JODI), which was created to improve the availability and reliability of 
international data on crude oil, LPG, gasoline, kerosene, gas/diesel, heavy oil, etc.69  By the 
end of 2006, nearly 100 countries were participating, but JODI was still a work in progress. 
 
The World Bank: Global understanding of the strong connection between energy and 
development is growing.  Over the course of the various global environment/development 
summits, from the 1972 Stockholm Summit to the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, energy became an ever more prominent theme.70  Yet adequate 
financing and appropriate policy frameworks for energy in developing countries remains 
problematic, with a particularly egregious gap in meeting the needs of the poorest. Although 
most financing for energy development goes through private sector hands, various agencies 
of the UN system and the multilateral development banks, and in particular the World Bank, 
play a key role in setting the terms of the debate and in providing funding.  
 
At the Gleneagles Summit in 2005, the G8 asked the World Bank to prepare an investment 
framework on clean energy for developing countries.71  At the 2006 annual meeting of the 
IMF/World Bank Board of Governors, held in Singapore that year, the Bank released its 
strategy.72  The report acknowledged that meeting the MDGs would require far more 
aggressive action than is contemplated under the IEA’s reference scenario.  To address the 
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needs of the poorest, the report called for an Action Plan with five components and with 
particular attention to sub-Saharan Africa:  
 
(a) scaled-up programs of household electrification (with better integration of mini-grid 
and off-grid electricity options to complement grid-based approaches); 
(b) additional generation capacity with associated transmission (including through regional 
projects) to serve newly connected households and demand from enterprises, public 
facilities, and other users; 
(c) access to clean cooking, heating, and lighting fuels (through sustainable forest 
management, fuel switching, and diffusion of improved charcoal, briquetting, and clean 
cooking technologies); 
(d) provision of energy services for key public facilities, such as schools and clinics; and 
(e) provision of stand-alone lighting packages for households without electricity service.73 
 
But the financing that would be needed to connect all households for electricity by 2030 is 
substantial, on the order of $34 billion a year through 2030.74 
 
With regard to a transition to clean energy, the World Bank’s report pointed out that despite 
the existence of some funding vehicles at the various multilateral development banks (the 
EBRD Energy Efficiency Facility, the Inter-American Development Bank Sustainable 
Energy Initiative, and the Asian Development Bank Asia Pacific Energy Efficiency Fund, in 
addition to the World Bank’s own funding), funding available for clean energy projects was 
negligible compared to the need.  It called for the establishment of a new Clean Energy 
Financing Vehicle (loans) and a new Clean Energy Support Vehicle (grants). 
 
The report was not well received. Developing country governments were highly suspicious of 
the initiative because of its source - the G8 and the northern-dominated World Bank.  The 
environmental and development research and activist communities claimed that the strategy 
failed either to serve the interests of the poor or to make serious progress toward limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
They argued that the Bank’s proposed investment framework reflected a longstanding 
predisposition at the Bank to use its funding to energy business-as-usual. In a report also 
issued at the Singapore meetings, Bank critics laid out a series of pointed criticisms of the 
Bank’s approach to energy. 75  Overall, as the critics point out, the Bank’s strategy, and 
indeed its lending portfolio, do little more than tinker around the edges, largely accepting the 
continuation of business as usual practices in energy rather than trying to lead the way in a 
more fundamental transformation of the energy sector.  Although the Bank, under pressure 
from NGOs, has repeatedly promised significant changes in its policies,76 its actual practices 
remain firmly wedded to lending for centralized large-scale and mostly fossil fuel-based 
energy projects, to the tune of $2 to $3 billion a year, some ten times the amount made 
available for other energy sources.  As Graph 3 indicates, both the Bank and the International 
Finance Corporation devote very little of their loan portfolios to renewables.  The Bank, for 
its part, contended that renewables are not available on the scale needed to meet the world’s 
growing demands and that continued investment in fossil fuel projects in poor countries is 
essential. 
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Graph 3:  World Bank and IFC Energy Funding 
 
 
Source:  Power Failure:  How the World Bank is Failing to Adequately Finance Renewable Energy for 
Development, p. 13, http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/institutions/renewableenergyreport10242005.pdf 
 
Other Initiatives: 
At the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development and thereafter, a wide 
range of initiatives have attempted to redress some of the shortcomings of energy 
governance.  Many of these focus on renewable sources of energy, reflecting the view among 
many environmentalists and some development specialists that renewables provides a double 
whammy – avoiding greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental externalities, and 
often providing local jobs and more easily decentralized energy sources.77  A few of the more 
notable undertakings include: 
 
• The EU Energy Initiative for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development, 
launched at Johannesburg, to help developing countries to maximize energy 
efficiency and increase the use of renewable sources of energy.78 
 
• The London-based Global Village Energy Partnership, also launched in 
Johannesburg, which aims to help developing countries establish energy action plans, 
and which brings together some 1500 energy SMEs and NGOs in developing 
countries with donors and providers of technical assistance.79  
 
• The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), launched by the 
UK in August 2003 as a multi-stakeholder coalition that promotes renewable and 
energy efficiency systems. It works on policy and regulatory initiatives for clean 
energy, and facilitates financing for energy projects, with the backing of more than 
200 national governments, businesses, development banks and NGOs. It has eight 
regional secretariats around the world, in additional to the international secretariat.80 
 
• REN21 - the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century – grew out of 
the “Renewables 2004” conference in Bonn.  Its 32-member Steering Committee 
includes representatives from governments, IGOs, NGOs, industry, finance, regional 
governments, local governments, and members at-large.  With a Paris-based 
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secretariat, REN21 hosts meetings, issues publications, and broadly advocates for 
good renewable energy policies.81 
 
• the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate, set up by Australia, 
China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United States to accelerate the 
development and deployment of clean energy technologies and related goods and 
services.  The partnership has set up eight public-private task forces covering 
aluminum, buildings and appliances, cement, cleaner use of fossil fuel, coal mining, 
power generation and transmission, renewable energy and distributed generation, and 
steel.  The members collectively comprise roughly half of the world's economy, 
population and energy use.82 
 
 
Building Blocks for Energy Governance 
The challenge for global energy governance is daunting, given the massive scale of the 
problem. The IEA’s forecast of $22 trillion needed in new energy investment by 2030 is 
almost certainly a gross underestimate, as the IEA does not assume the world will provide 
full access to energy services to the world’s poor, does not account for the costs of adequately 
protecting the environment or human rights, and does not take into account the costs of 
protecting energy infrastructure.  As the preceding analysis makes clear, existing governance 
mechanisms are woefully inadequate to provide energy security, address energy-related 
environmental externalities, protect human rights from violations during the process of 
extracting energy resources, and ensure that energy services are sufficiently available to the 
poor to meet the MDGs and other development goals.  But it is not easy to put forward 
feasible recommendations for significant improvements in the processes of global energy 
governance. 
 
New or Expanded Intergovernmental Organizations? 
A common response to perceived needs for global governance is to call for the creation or 
expansion of a formal inter-governmental organization, preferably one with teeth. Thus, for 
example, then-French President Jacques Chirac called for the transformation of the UN’s 
Environment Programme into a “genuine international organization to which all countries 
belong, along the lines of the World Health Organization” to promote sustainable 
technologies and behavior patterns and to support “the implementation of environmental 
decisions across the planet,”83 which obviously would have significant implications for 
energy policy. Similarly, it has frequently been proposed that the International Energy 
Agency, as the club of major oil importers, should expand its membership to include at a 
minimum China, India, and other emerging markets.  And the purpose of creating the IEF 
was to pull together all parties on energy. 
 
But the near-term prospects for new overarching formal organizations, or for a substantial 
expansion of their authority, are not bright.  As one recent analysis of global governance 
concluded: 
 
…the conditions at the beginning of the twenty-first century do not seem ripe 
for any major systemic breakthroughs that would replace current structures 
and create new institutions.  The vision and sense of urgency, the innovative 
spirit, and the leadership that brought the IMF and the World Bank into being 
at Bretton Woods in 1944 and created the United Nations in San Francisco in 
1945 are not present today.84 
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Thus, it is not surprising that Chirac’s repeated calls for a WEO have not been strongly 
endorsed by other major powers. Although more than 40 countries supported the proposal, 
the US, India, China, and Russia all expressed opposition.  There seems little likelihood that 
the IEF, with its intense focus on oil and gas, could be expanded into a broader energy 
organization. 
 
Even the prospect of IEA expansion seems uncertain.  Aside from the membership criterion 
of democratic governance (an artifact of the IEA’s origin as an OECD creation), there are 
serious worries over sharing data, doubts about the capacity of China and India to meet the 
basic requirement to create and maintain a 90-day oil stockpile, and concerns about the 
disruption to the IEA’s internal political balance.  The IEA has what must be the most 
convoluted voting structure of any intergovernmental organization – one published effort to 
explain the system runs to 16 pages of print – but the important point is that the system is 
carefully balanced to ensure that decisions on most issues require either unanimity or special 
majorities, and that neither the US nor the EU is in a position to veto a decision requiring 
majority vote.85  Because voting weights are calculated in part on the basis of oil 
consumption, the addition of India and China would put those countries’ voting shares equal 
to or ahead of all other members except the US. 
 
 Conclusion: the Desirable and the Achievable 
 In an ideal world, energy governance, like all forms of global governance, would entail fully 
accountable institutions with widespread participation, able to supply the full range of 
energy-related public goods.  A starting point would be to recognize the connected nature of 
that full energy agenda. To that end, it might be useful to take each one of these difficult and 
intractable big problems, and make them bigger. Creating a more coherent framework would 
have the great advantage of allowing for grand bargains that could ensure everyone’s most 
fundamental interests were met. 
 
It may, for example, be more effective to bundle climate change with broader energy issues, 
rather than treat it in isolation.  It is much easier to make a case for why both rich and poor 
countries should adopt sound energy policies for geostrategic, environmental (including non-
climate change environmental) and development self-interest reasons than it is to persuade 
developing nations that they should bear a significant part of the burden of countering a 
climate change problem they had little part in creating.  There is at least some hope that such 
major players as the US and China might be receptive to this broader approach.  It appears 
overwhelmingly likely that the next US Presidential election will reduce if not eliminate US 
obstructionism on climate change issues, after which China will no longer be able to use US 
inaction as an excuse for its own non-participation in global governance efforts.  And China’s 
public statements on climate change indicate a rapidly growing awareness among Chinese 
leaders about the potentially disastrous impacts for China itself of global warming. 
 
Already, energy policy is a central focus on such over-arching institutions as the G8 and the 
EU.  With real political leadership from the US in particular, a broad global consensus on a 
more coherent approach to energy is not out of the realm of possibility. 
 
It is more likely, however, that at least in the short term, improvements in energy governance 
will be piecemeal and incremental.  Such improvements could make a real, if limited,  
difference: 
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• The World Bank could put its funding where its rhetoric has long been, with much 
more attention to energy efficiency and to the possibility of a massive, Bank-funded 
shift to renewable energy technologies - wind, solar, modern biomass, geothermal and 
small hydropower.   
 
• Existing IEA outreach efforts to China and India could be expanded into the 
development of a more global system of reserves and emergency stocks. 
 
• The Joint Oil Data Initiative could be further developed, and could serve as a 
prototype for other systems to provide fully, timely, and accurate information on 
global energy markets. 
 
• More effective diplomacy could help to entice Russia into a more constructive role in 
the Energy Charter Treaty and other international energy governance regimes. 
 
• Expanded political support from both governments and corporations for the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative could help to reduce what are currently extremely 
high levels of corruption associated with the extraction of energy resources. 
 
These pieces still leave enormous gaps.  There is still a need for full, timely, and accurate 
information on the environmental externalities resulting from various energy policies.  There 
is still a need for a globally agreed system to develop redundant and therefore resilient 
infrastructure (pipelines, refineries, decentralized supply, etc.) for providing energy services.  
And most important, there is still a need for a meeting of minds to ensure that energy is 
conceived of as a shared interest rather than a geopolitical competition 
 
If we accept the premise that energy is a zero-sum game, there is little room for optimism that 
global governance can cope.  But if we redefine the energy problematique to focus not on 
particular sources of energy (such as oil) but rather on energy services, the picture is 
somewhat rosier.  Most of the world shares mutual interests in the development of effective 
energy markets, coordinated policies on taxes and subsidies, effective responses to climate 
change, and serious investment in alternative energy technologies for developing countries to 
put them on sustainable path now rather than through retrofitting.  
 
These are all obvious policy prescriptions, which are repeated in numerous reports.  The 
world has taken at best baby steps in most of these areas.  But we will never get beyond baby 
steps unless we develop far more effective institutional mechanisms. 
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